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1976 Montreal Olympics: Case Study of Project 
Management Failure 
Ashish Patel1 ; Paul A. Bosela, F.ASCE2 ; and Norbert J. Delatte, F.ASCE3 
Introduction 
On May 12. 1970. extensive lobbying and d iplomacy by Montreal 
Mayor Jean Drapeau paid off when Montreal was awarded the 1976 
Olympic Games over strong bids from Moscow and Los Angeles. 
Although both competing cities provided fimmc iul guarantees. 
Drapeau sialed thai the Games would cost il rnilximum of $124 
million and that the history and reputation of Montreal would stand 
in place of a guarantee (Auf deT Maur 1976). 
For the next few years, very little was done. The original plan was 
scrapped. Mayor Drapeau became enamored with architect Roger 
Taill ibert 's Pare des Princcs in Paris. Tellingly, the construction cost for 
thai stadi um had ballooned from the original estimated $9 million to 
a final cost of $25 mi ll ion. Drnpeau se[ected Taillibert without a com­
petition. Like Taillibert. Dmpeau had had previous problems with cost 
oveffilns. The Olympic bid wa~ based in part on Montreal's successfu l 
hosting of the [967 Expo. However. the finul cost ofthe Expo was $430 
million- much more thoo the 1964 estimate of $ 160 million. A new 
plan was laid out in a press conference on April 6, 1972. Almost 2 years 
of preparation time had been wa'>ted (Auf der Maur (976). 
In November [972. Drapeau gave a fi gure of $3 10 mil lion a~ the 
tOial projected cost of the Olympic Games. Of the $250 million in 
capital expenditures in the budget, $130.8 million was for the sta­
dium and $ 16.4 million forthe velodrome. The Olympic Village was 
listed undernoncapital expenditures as $5 mi llion. Howell teons this 
Drapeau 's kitchen-table budget that no one ever took seriously but 
that also no oneever gathered the data to challenge. It was suspicious 
from the stan, however, because the recenlly concluded Munich 
Games had cost lhe equivalent of $600 million. Shortly afterward. 
in January 1973. Drapeau made his often-quoted (llIld often-derided) 
statement that "the Monlreal Olympics can no more have a defi ci t 
than a man cun have a baby" (Howel l 2009). Howell later observed 
that ··amazingly. evcry time the Mayor revised his cost estimate. we 
believed thaI it was COITt!c t at last" (Howell 2009). 
Drapeuu laid out u plan for $3 [0 million in financing. the bulk of 
which would come from the sale of $250 million in Olympic com­
memomtive coins. The fedeml government of Cooada reviewed the 
budget and thought that $ [00 million in coin s:tles would be more 
rc;l listic. The federal government did nOI want to get stuck with the bill 
for the construction or the Games. The c ity of MonlrcuJ had mude Ihe 
commitmcnt. and Cooada und the Province of Quebec did not wish to 
be responsible for fu lfi ll ing that commitment. Strangely. they seemed 
to think that the construction cosl estimates were in the ballpark. At 
this point in the process. Drapeau suggested at 11 news conference that 
the real problem would be figuring out how to spend the surplus from 
the fi rst self-financing Games in Olympic history (Howell 2009). 
The extensive construction of the Olympic facilities was justi ­
fied. in pan. on the idea that the facilit ies could be used after the 
Games for other spons. specifica lly using the O lympic Stadium for 
the Montreal Expos baseball team. However. the potential users 
were not consulted during the pl:l11lling process (Howell 2009). The 
suitability of the fuci lities for usc lifter the Games ended will be 
discussed later in this paper 
James Neal begins his textbook. entit led COlI,rtm ctioll Cost Es-
lill!(IIillg COII"epls and Their Appliw tiol1s (Neil 1979), with an 
eight-page case study of the Montreal Olympics complex. Nick Auf 
der MaUL a newspaper columnist and member of the Montreal City 
Council. wrote The BiIlioll·Dollar Came: Jelln DrUpe(1II (md the 
/976 Olympics about all the problems (Auf der Maur (976), 
In late July 1976, at the ﬁnal session of the World Congress on 
Space Structures, a highly controversial panel discussion was held 
on the project, which was later documented in ASCE’s Civil En­
gineering magazine. It included some prominent consulting engi­
neers from the United States, such as Anton Tedesko and Lev Zetlin, 
and some engineers and architects from Canada and elsewhere. A 
sidebar to the article summarized some of the comments that had 
appeared in the Montreal Star newspaper under the title, “Cost-Be-
Damned Attitude Brought on Olympic Woes” (Civil Engineering 
1976). 
This paper has been assembled from a variety of sources rather 
than ﬁrsthand observations. As such, it could be subject to the biases 
of the authors of the source information and may be inadvertently 
slanted. Care has been taken to balance the opposing viewpoints as 
much as possible. 
Olympic Games, Politics, and Prestige 
The quadrennial Olympic Games are so prestigious that cities and 
countries commit substantial resources to bidding for the right to 
hold them and then invest heavily in the facilities in which to hold 
them. For the 1976 Games, Moscow and Los Angeles both bid 
against Montreal, and concerns about cold war politics weighted the 
scales in Montreal’s favor. Moscow would host the 1980 Games, 
boycotted by the United States and its allies, and Los Angeles would 
host the 1984 Games, boycotted by the Soviet Union and its allies, 
showing that the concerns about politics were well-founded. The 
Montreal Games also took place against the backdrop of the 1972 
Munich Games and the hostage crisis that resulted in the death of 
Israeli athletes. After 1972, there were concerns about how the 
Games could go on, if they should, and how they could be kept safe. 
Kidd (1992) contends that the politics of Canada, Quebec, and 
Montreal played a large part in the difﬁculties of the 1976 Games. 
Much of the tension was brought about by the resurgence of 
Quebec’s Francophone nationalism and the succession movement. 
In addition, Montreal had long been dominated economically, po­
litically, and culturally by a small Anglophone elite that was at odds 
with the Quebec nationalism movement. The federal government of 
Canada supported Montreal’s bid reluctantly and ruled out direct 
ﬁnancial support for the Games. Furthermore, Mayor Drapeau and 
Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau did not trust each other. As 
a result, it took a long time to set up the Olympic lottery and coin and 
stamp program to support the Games, which cost 34 months of lead 
time. The program was slowed by unpaid bills until the Province of 
Quebec reluctantly agreed to accept responsibility for any deﬁcit in 
early 1973. 
The potential embarrassment of missing the opening of the 
Games provided a ﬁxed construction deadline. The planning started 
about 2 years too late, and scheduling fell apart because it was phy­
sically impossible to accommodate all the construction activities 
on the project site. The City of Montreal was too slow in preparing 
bid documents, so the work could not be competitively bid but 
was instead awarded to selected contractors. Double crews, double 
shifts, and overtime were used to attempt to increase productivity, 
but because of congestion, the increase in productivity was slight 
(Neil 1979). 
Political turmoil intervened during the Montreal Games. Canada 
refused to allow the Republic of China (Taiwan) to compete because 
Canada had recognized the People’s Republic of China in 1970, 
despite the fact that the Republic of China was a member of the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC). This caused considerable 
friction with the United States. A much larger issue came about 
involving New Zealand’s participation in the Games because the 
New Zealand rugby team had just played in South Africa, and South 
Africa was barred from the Olympics during the apartheid era. Just 
before the Montreal Olympics started, 28 African countries walked 
out of the Games, joined by Guyana and Iraq (Strenk 1978). 
The issues of the politics and prestige of the Olympic Games 
have continued since Montreal. “There’s a myth growing, on this 
Olympic mess, that it all started with the tacky, overcommercialized 
Summer Games in Atlanta. Which led to all the bribes and greed of 
Salt Lake City. It’s a nice myth, but it’s wrong. The real sleaze got its 
start with Jean Drapeau and the 1976 Olympic Games in Montreal. 
There was the blueprint for corruption.” (Fotheringham 1999, p. 76). 
Montreal Olympic Complex 
The Montreal Olympic complex consisted of a main stadium, a ve­
lodrome (bicycle racing venue), roads, walkways, practice ﬁelds, an 
Olympic Village housing facility, and other structures and land­
scaping. The complex is shown in Fig. 1. 
Planning began in 1970, and preliminary estimates prepared at 
that time indicated a projected cost for the entire complex of $120 
million, including a projected cost for the main stadium of $40 
million. The ﬁnal cost in 1976 was $1.5 billion, with $836 million 
for the main stadium. In addition to the cost overruns, there were 
considerable time overruns, which meant that the complex was al­
most not completed in time for the Olympics, and some of the ﬁnal 
activities were still ongoing at the time the Olympics started. Major 
components originally planned, such as the retractable roof, were 
not begun until after the Olympics (Neil 1979). 
The original owner was the City of Montreal, Quebec, which 
contracted with architect Roger Taillibert to design the Olympic 
Park, including the Olympic Stadium and velodrome (Auf der Maur 
1976). Mr. Taillibert lived and conducted business in Paris, France. 
Both the velodrome and Olympic Stadium were relatively unusual, 
unique artistic creations. 
The Mayor of Montreal, Jean Drapeau, has been criticized for an 
almost worshipful attitude toward Taillibert. The mayor rejected 
cuts that could have saved up to $146 million. He insisted on 
building the stadium of concrete rather than steel because Taillibert 
was a precast-concrete expert—although a steel stadium might have 
cost $100 million less (Civil Engineering 1976). 
Taillabert, who was to be paid $10–15 million for his work, did 
not help public relations with his lack of modesty, saying “That’s all 
Fig. 1. Olympic Stadium complex during the 1976 Olympic Games 
(Parc Olympic Quebec 2011; credit: Olympic Park of Montréal) 
Canadians and North Americans talk about—money, money, 
money. It doesn’t interest me at all,” telling a reporter “Are you 
aware that the building of the stadium and velodrome constitutes 
a great moment in the history of architecture and technology?” (Civil 
Engineering 1976). 
Velodrome 
Prior to bidding for the Olympic Games, the City of Montreal had 
already committed to hosting the World Cycling Championships in 
the Olympic velodrome for the summer of 1974. Construction of 
the velodrome began in August 1973, a year in advance of the 
scheduled opening of the Championships on August 14, 1974. 
However, it turned out that the rocky subsoil was not solid enough 
to support the roof—a fact that had not been found by geologic 
soundings and subsurface tests. The location near the Saint Law­
rence River, however, hinted at probable subsurface difﬁculties. The 
foundation problems, along with labor union conﬂicts, ensured that 
the velodrome could not open in time for the Championships. A 
temporary facility was quickly built at the University of Montréal 
football stadium. The makeshift site had an excellent view of 
Mount Royal and would have served very well for the Olympic 
Games, although the spectator capacity would have been less. The 
incident highlighted the problems with the Olympic construction, 
but by this time there were less than 2 years left to go (Howell 
2009). 
The contract for the velodrome construction was awarded to 
prime contractor Charles Duranceau with a $12 million bid, based 
on half-complete plans, in August 1973, and construction began 
later that year. It was the ﬁrst and last contract of the Montreal 
Olympics issued through public bidding (Auf der Maur 1976). 
The velodrome consisted of three arches supported by abut­
ments. It was designed to have the appearance of a cycling helmet, 
as shown in Fig. 2. The structure consisted almost entirely of arches 
171 m (560 ft) long and rising to 27 m (90 ft) high. The arches were 
made of precast-concrete sections positioned onto falsework on site 
and then posttensioned (D’Appolonia 1990). 
The horizontal component H of the arch thrust is given by 
qL2 
H ¼ ð1Þ 
8d 
where q 5 uniform load along the arch, L 5 span of the arch, and d 5 
height of the arch. For a given span L, as the depth decreases, the 
horizontal force increases. The low aspect ratio d/L of the arch, about 
1:6, produced very high horizontal thrust forces. 
The arch was supported by four abutments, designated W, X, Y, 
and Z in Fig. 3. Abutments X and Y were founded on good rock, but 
the rock was of questionable quality at Abutments W and Z. Addi­
tional investigations showed that the rock was broken up to a depth 
of about 6 m (20 ft) and was over a thin layer of clay shale 150–600 
mm (6 in. to 2 ft) thick. The thin layer represented a potential slip 
surface for the abutments, and as a result, tendons had to be driven 
through that layer into competent rock (D’Appolonia 1990) (Fig. 4). 
Abutment Z, unlike the other three abutments, takes the combined 
thrust of three arches and, as a result, has to resist the highest forces. 
A critical construction operation was the decentering, or re­
moval of the supporting falsework for the arches. The process 
would create the greatest loads on the abutments, about 32,000 tons 
on Abutment Z. A total of 36 jacks were used, each with a stroke 
of 25 mm (1 in.). Only 13 mm (0.5 in.) of displacement could be 
tolerated during decentering, and the operation was carefully mon­
itored (D’Appolonia 1990). 
The soil problem of low bearing capacity and the high loads on 
the abutments had resulted in substantial time delays and cost 
overruns for the foundation work. Although the foundation of the 
velodrome had been estimated to cost $497,576, the ﬁnal cost was 
$7,171, 876 because of the extensive grouting and anchorage system 
shown in Fig. 4. A large part of the construction delay was because 
the contractor had to wait on Taillibert to ﬁnish the plans. Once the 
ﬁnal plans were received, it was necessary to develop construction 
plans for the falsework. The work quickly fell behind, and it was 
Fig. 2. Velodrome, now a biodome (Wikipedia Commons, http:// 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Biodome_Montreal.jpg, photograph by 
PtitLutin) 
Fig. 3. Plan and elevation of velodrome (1 ft 5 0:3 m)  
obvious that the 1974 date could not be met. More workers were 
hired, and extensive overtime was authorized, but the extra workers 
mostly got in each others’ way. By late fall 1974, $34 million had been 
spent on the velodrome, and it was not complete. New subcontractors 
were hired. Given the time constraints, most of the construction 
contracts were cost plus rather than low-bid ﬁxed-cost contracts. 
There also were a number of labor problems, such as tasks taking 
too long, strikes, overtime, and extra equipment, which themselves 
added about $12 million to the project cost (Auf der Maur 1976). 
The ﬁnal cost for the 7,000-seat velodrome was approximately 
$70 million, compared with a $60 million cost for a 60,000-seat 
domed stadium in Seattle, Washington, at the same time. The cost 
per seat was 10 times as high. There also remained the concern that 
acrylic panels in the roof posed a ﬁre hazard (Auf der Maur 1976). 
Anton Tedesko was known for his efﬁcient thin-concrete-shell 
structures, epitomized by the Hershey Arena that spanned 67 m 
(220 ft) with a shell only 89 mm (3.5 in.) thick (Billington and 
Billington 2006). He was strongly critical of the velodrome, stating 
that it should have had a greater construction depth (or height) that 
would have greatly reduced the forces. As Eq. (1) shows, H is in­
versely proportional to d. It could also have been more structurally 
efﬁcient if the dome and three-dimensional action had been con­
sidered in the design. Tedesko stated that the structures “do damage 
to the cause of concrete. Our young people should be told that these 
structures did not have to be done this way. As built, this gigantic 
demonstration project is almost an argument against the use of con­
crete and for the use of structural steel or aluminum under similar 
circumstances in the future” (Civil Engineering 1976, pp. 50–51). 
The velodrome was renovated starting in 1989 and transformed 
into a biodome managed by the City of Montreal in 1992. It is now 
part of the Montreal Nature Museum (Parc Olympique Quebec 2011). 
Olympic Stadium 
All the structures were dramatic, modern, and complex, none more 
so than the main stadium. The stadium may be seen in the upper 
Fig. 4. Typical arch abutment (Abutment Z) (1 ft 5 0:3 m)  
right of Fig. 1 and in its ﬁnal conﬁguration in Fig. 5. The stadium 
had a number of unusual features. It was intended to resemble an 
elliptical seashell with a handle, which would have a retractable 
fabric cover hanging from a tall mast over the opening. As Fig. 1 
shows, the mast and cover were not in place at the time of the Olympics 
(Neil 1979). They were added later and may be seen in Fig. 5. 
The general structural form appears to be a large elliptical dome 
with an opening in the middle for the fabric roof. If it were, in fact, 
a thin dome with a compression ring, it would be an efﬁcient struc­
tural form. However, it isn’t. The main structural members are com­
plex precast concrete ribs, shown in Fig. 6. The ribs cantilever out 
over the stadium, and although the hollow ring inside the roof carries 
lighting and other support systems, it is not designed to carry com­
pression forces. Because of the gentle slope of the roof, each pair 
of ribs is a different size. The ribs were glued and posttensioned. 
They proved to be very difﬁcult to erect, so misalignments of the ribs 
were as much as 150 mm (6 in.). This was a problem because the 
posttensioning cables had to be threaded through tubes in the ring. 
During the winter, some empty posttensioning ducts became full of 
ice, and considerable time and expense were involved in removing 
Fig. 5. Olympic Stadium (Wikipedia Commons, http://en.wikipedia. 
org/wiki/File:Le_Stade_Olympique_3.jpg) 
Fig. 6. Ribs of the Olympic Stadium (Parc Olympic Quebec 2011; 
credit: Olympic Park of Montréal) 
the ice (Neil 1979). It has been estimated that if all the ribs had been 
the same size, $20–30 million could have been saved (Civil Engi­
neering 1976). 
Furthermore, the stadium design did not consider construct-
ability and did not leave room for interior scaffolding. Many cranes 
were used instead, some holding ribs, and others holding workers, 
tools, and materials. Fig. 7 shows the congestion of cranes in the 
stadium. At one point, 80 cranes were used in the main stadium, and 
it was estimated that doubling the number of cranes only increased 
productivity 25% because they could not work effectively given that 
they were in each other’s way (Neil 1979). 
“At one stage, there was a forest of 200 building cranes on the 
stadium site, some from as far as Calgary, while gravel truck drivers 
gleefully drove in, collected their fee, and then drove out the other 
end, unloaded, and just went around the block again. Skilled 
workers, at seven 10-hour shifts a week, pulled down $1,500 weekly 
by doing only 2 hours a day of actual work” (Fotheringham 1999, 
p. 76). 
Although epoxy-glued, posttensioned construction had been 
used successfully in Europe, it was new to the North American 
contractors. As with any new technology, there was a difﬁcult 
learning process (Neil 1979). With the time constraints on this 
project, the use of an unfamiliar technique was not a good idea. 
Taillibert did not deliver the plans and speciﬁcations for the 
Olympic Stadium until the late summer of 1974. He had already 
gained a reputation for late delivery of construction documents. The 
contract to build the Olympic Stadium was awarded to Desourdy and 
Duranceau, as cost plus $9 million proﬁt with a $1 million bonus if 
the site were ready on time. The contract was awarded without 
public tenders. It was a strange choice of contractor, given that 
Duranceau was already buried in difﬁculties with the velodrome. 
The Province of Quebec forced the hiring of Lalonde, Valois, 
Lamarre, Valois & Associates (known as Lalonde, Valois) as project 
manager over Drapeau’s resistance. The cost estimates of Lalonde, 
Valois proved to be no better than any of the others (Auf der Maur 
1976). 
At the beginning of 1975, the Olympic Organizing Committee 
(referred to as COJO from Comité de contrôle des Jeux olympiques) 
was very concerned about completion of the stadium and began to 
look for alternatives, such as ﬁnding or building a cheaper stadium 
nearby. Mayor Drapeau called an elaborate press conference to 
explain the cost projections and provide assurances that the stadium 
would be ready on time. He referred to a funding gap of $200 million, 
Fig. 7. Cranes at work in the Olympic Stadium (Parc Olympic Quebec 
2011; credit: Olympic Park of Montréal) 
refusing to call it a deﬁcit. The alternate-stadium concept was 
scrapped (Auf der Maur 1976). 
Very generous terms were given to the precasters who built the 
concrete ribs, including a $230,000 rental of one plant for Olympic 
construction and a $500,000 extension built onto another plant with 
public funds, plus $685,000 in cash bonuses and honoraria. Pre-
casting costs rose from $16 million to $42 million (Auf der Maur 
1976). 
Late in the game, Taillibert insisted on adding a water cascade to 
the top of the parking garages connected to the stadium, adding at 
least $8 million to the cost. The parking garages, originally budgeted 
for an extravagant $25 million, cost $60 million, or about $13,000 
per parking space. The water cascade also would require 113 million 
L (30 million gal) of water (Auf der Maur 1976). 
Mayor Drapeau, with no engineering or architecture qualiﬁca­
tions, had spent much time poring over plans and going to the 
construction site to give orders, which confused the workers. Then, 
on December 13, 1974, Drapeau sent a representative to a meeting to 
say that the stadium construction would cost substantially more. The 
project continued to be troubled by labor demonstrations and strikes. 
Finally, on November 19, 1975, the Province of Quebec created the 
Régie des Installations Olympiques (RIO) to complete construction 
of the Olympic Park and take over as owner. Drapeau and Taillibert 
were now off the site. In assuming control from the City of Montreal, 
however, Quebec also assumed the expense (Howell 2009). 
Quebec advanced $200 million for the project but in return had to 
delay other important construction in Montreal, such as the subway 
and a sewage treatment plant. At that time, Montreal was one of the 
few cities in the Western world still dumping raw, untreated sewage 
into a river. Bills were paid, and construction continued, with no 
better cost control than before (Auf der Maur 1976). 
The ﬁnal cost for the stadium was approximately $13,000 per 
seat, compared with approximately $2,400 per seat for the Super-
dome in New Orleans, Louisiana, constructed at approximately 
the same time (Neil 1979). The stadium was nicknamed the Big O 
because of its name and shape, but it later became known as the Big 
Owe (“Quebec’s” 2006). 
Tedesko and consulting engineer Lev Zetlin both criticized the 
stadium. Tedesko noted that anyone familiar with match-cast post-
tensioned precast-concrete construction would have predicted the 
difﬁculties encountered. Zetlin stated that a large-span structure 
should be light, permit a large margin of error in the ﬁeld, and use 
construction methods that were as simple as possible, and the 
Montreal Olympic Stadium violated all these principles. He further 
criticized the heavy roof as a dead weight on top of the building 
(Civil Engineering 1976). 
After the 1976 Olympics, the Olympic Stadium saga continued. 
It was found that the tower could not be completed as planned in 
concrete without major structural work because it would be too 
heavy and that the tower would be overstressed by the Canadian 
standard (“Court” 1983). The tower was completed in steel and was 
damaged by a ﬁre during construction (“Fire” 1986). The roof and 
tower were completed, but the retractable Kevlar roof was not in­
stalled until 1986 and was stored in France and then Montreal at 
a cost of several million dollars. In 1989, the roof developed huge 
tears because of air pressure (“Experts” 1989). In 1991, a 55-t chunk 
of the roof fell after support beams snapped, forcing an extended 
closure. Fortunately, there were no injuries. All 33 beams had to be 
reinforced at a cost of several hundred thousand dollars. The failure 
may have been because of the use of an improper (e.g., not corrosion-
resistant) type of steel or poor welding (“55-ton” 1991; “Suspect” 
1991). Finally, RIO decided to replace the roof (“Fixing” 1993). The 
new roof tore again in the winter of 1999, forcing the cancellation of an 
auto show and a subsequent boat show (“Stadium” 1999). 
Olympic Village 
The Olympic Village project began in 1970, when at the presen­
tations to win the Olympic bid in Amsterdam, Jean Drapeau an­
nounced that the Olympic Village would be a low-rise structure 
that would be placed just to the east of the Olympic Stadium and 
Velodrome. The mayor said that the village would be used to pro­
vide for 4,000 low-cost housing units after the Olympics were over, 
serving up to 14,000 tenants. The concept would ﬁt in well for his 
self-ﬁnancing Olympics because the Central Mortgage and Housing 
Commission (CMHC) would provide 95% of the clearance cost and 
75% of the construction cost (Auf der Maur 1976). 
There was a great debate on both where to place the Olympic 
Village and whether the village would be centralized or spread out. 
There were many protests against placing the complex in Viau Park 
because it would take away green space from a city that didn’t have 
much of it. However, at the end of 1972, Mayor Drapeau announced 
that the Olympic Village was going to be built in the park and that the 
village would be centralized, over all objections. The city also 
destroyed 125 elm trees on the site after promising not to remove 
any (Auf der Maur 1976). 
“In January 1974, a group from Montreal arrived in Baie des 
Anges, on the Côte d’Azur in southern France, the site of a spec­
tacular pyramid-shaped condominium complex designed by archi­
tect André Minangoy. The visitors, who included Montreal developer 
Joseph Zappia, told the sales director of the Baie des Anges project 
that they had been selected to build the Olympic Village for 1976. This 
was odd because the deadline for tenders was not until March 1, 
almost two months in the future” (Auf der Maur 1976). 
When the project went out to bid, 53 different groups or com­
panies had paid the $100 to pick up the preliminary speciﬁcations 
and requirements. However, as the March 1 deadline came and went, 
the city announced that there were no suitable proposals and that the 
deadline was going to be postponed indeﬁnitely. As time went on, 
many of the bidding companies never heard anything at all from the 
city regarding their respective bids. For example, a British developer 
had spent in the vicinity of $400,000 to develop a private plan, which 
required no excess public money. The bid was submitted in the 
summer of 1973, well before the deadline. Unfortunately for the 
developer, his company never received a yes or a no regarding 
the subject. After never receiving a reply, the developer packed up, 
left, and vowed that he would never conduct business in Quebec 
again. Other strong bids were also ignored (Auf der Maur 1976). 
At a meeting on June 28, 1974, Mayor Drapeau announced that 
a group called Las Terrasses Zarolega would construct the Olympic 
Village. It seemed to be the ﬁrst indication for most that Zarolega 
even existed. Although the original call for proposals speciﬁed 
1,800 units (mysteriously down from 4,000), Zarolega proposed to 
build only 932 units. To house 12,000 athletes, as many as 12 people 
would have to sleep in the larger two-bedroom units, and many 
would have to sleep in the kitchens. The design was ill suited for 
Montreal’s cold winters because there were no indoor corridors, and 
the units had to be accessed by walking up to 180 m (600 ft) along 
exterior balconies open to the wind. The previously mentioned 
Zappia was one of the four partners of Zarolega (Auf der Maur 
1976). 
Responsibility for construction of the Olympic Village had been 
left vague until very late in the process. The original idea was that 
either a private developer or the city’s public housing commission 
would develop the village and keep it separate from COJO. On 
October 22, 1974, Lord Killanin, head of the IOC, phoned to say that 
if the City of Montreal did not have a contract in place by the time of 
the IOC’s upcoming Vienna meeting (October 20, 1974), the IOC 
would consider transferring the Games to another city. The Olympic 
Village task became the responsibility of COJO, mostly because 
Drapeau was so far behind. The original budget had not included the 
village under the premise that it would be built, ﬁnanced, and owned 
by the private sector with funding support from the city’s public 
housing through the CMHC. It turned out, however, that the pyramid 
conﬁguration disqualiﬁed the project for CMHC funding—only 
buildings that had widths greater than their heights could be sup­
ported. This could have, and should have, been determined much 
earlier in the process (Howell 2009). Another reason given by 
Zarolega for the lack of CMHC support was that units in the 
$20,000–$60,000 price range hardly qualiﬁed as low-cost public 
housing (Auf der Maur 1976). 
Although the IOC tried to consider alternatives, it was clear that 
the Zarolega plan was locked in, and there weren’t really any levers 
with which to negotiate. Cost estimates rose from the $30 million 
estimated by Zarolega on October 19, 1974, to $70 million. On 
March 7, 1975, the IOC contracted with Hanscomb Roy and Asso­
ciates to oversee the Olympic Village construction. There were 
concerns that COJO had no charter to own property and would be 
paying Zarolega twice, once before the Games and again for post-
Game renovations to resell the units for apartments (Howell 2009). 
Zarolega received a generous cost-plus contract without a not-to­
exceed clause. The plus was 12% on the ﬁrst $30 million and 6% on 
anything above. Zarolega estimated that the project would not ex­
ceed $45 million. Concerns about the potential cost led to the gov­
ernment committee hiring of a consultant for a second opinion. He 
predicted a project cost of $55–58 million, with a possible $10 
million overtime bill. Despite the second opinion, the committee 
went with the Zarolega estimate. A number of problems occurred 
during the construction, including outrageous subcontracts, dan­
gerous construction techniques, poor coordination, and theft. Many 
construction operations were managed so as to generate the highest 
costs and thus the highest proﬁts, with proﬁts on the work required to 
ﬁx previous botched work. A new consultant was brought in to 
manage the construction, with limited success. The actual cost for 
the Olympic Village was approximately $70 million. The project 
eventually resulted in a police raid and investigation (Auf der Maur 
1976). 
On completion of the complex structure in August 1975, there 
was a ceremony in which a tree was hoisted to the top of the building. 
Not long after all the dignitaries left, a piece of the eighth-ﬂoor 
balcony went crashing down onto the balconies below. After in­
vestigation, it was concluded that the balcony had failed owing to 
a lack of proper anchoring (Auf der Maur 1976). 
The completed Olympic Village is shown in Fig. 8. The Olympic 
Village was intended to be sold as apartment buildings after the 
Games (Howell 2009). RIO managed the property after the Games, 
and by 1980,  all  981 apartments  had been rented,  and the  village  
had 2,000 residents. The Olympic Village was sold to private 
interests in 1998 (Parc Olympique Quebec 2011). It is hard to 
imagine that the purchase price was anywhere close to the $70 
million it cost to build the village because that would be more than 
$70,000 per unit. 
Viaduct 
The main-road viaduct also had a relatively high construction cost 
because of its design. Although the main road was straight, the 
viaduct had a complex design, with curved faces and outstretched 
legs. The curved surfaces resulted in the inability to use standard, 
reusable formwork. The formwork cost for some parts of the viaduct 
was as much as $4,300/m2 ($400/ft2), about 15 times the cost of 
Fig. 8. Olympic Village (Wikipedia Commons, http://commons. 
wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Olympic_Village_Montreal_Jan_2008.JPG) 
conventional formwork. Hence, the ﬁnal cost of the viaduct was 
approximately $14 million versus a projected cost of only $5 million 
if a more conventional design would have been used. The project 
was so complex that no contractor would bid on a ﬁxed-price con­
tract. The contractor who built it demanded a cost-plus-ﬁxed-fee 
contract under conditions that he would not be responsible for the 
ﬁnal structure (Neil 1979). 
The 180-m-long (600-ft-long) viaduct used a complicated 
inverted triangular pillar system for support. An engineering ﬁrm 
proposed changes, but Drapeau turned them down because they 
would interfere with Taillibert’s vision. The contractor could not 
ﬁnd scaffolding in Montreal, so new scaffolding was bought else­
where for $1.5 million (Auf der Maur 1976). 
Systemic Problems 
Neil (1979) discusses a number of systemic problems that affected 
all aspects of the Olympic Complex construction. He notes that 
union labor was used, and “approximately 80 days were lost to 
strikes and the equivalent of about another 20 days . . . lost through 
slowdowns. The project had all of the qualities which tempt labor 
unions to take advantage of the client—there was a ﬁxed schedule, 
labor was scarce, and there were no agreements between labor and 
management to restrict strikes” (Neil 1979). 
With all the construction going on, labor and other resources 
became scarce. This added to project costs. Poor weather inhibited 
construction—not much a surprise given the northern climate of 
Montreal. At the peak, construction heating measures cost $400,000 
per day. In early 1976, the Province of Quebec issued an ultimatum 
that the workers had to speed up or the project would be shut down 
and the Games moved to other facilities. Following the ultimatum, in 
better weather, productivity increased 500%. A plumbers’ and 
electricians’ slowdown delayed ﬁnal turnover of the project by 
a week, until June 14, just 3 weeks before the start of the Games (Neil 
1979). The extensive labor problems are described by Auf der Maur 
(1976). There were also 12 workers killed during construction (Auf 
der Maur 1976). 
Another systemic problem was that all the design and engi­
neering were done in France using the metric or Système Inter­
national (SI) system of units. However, the project was built using 
the English system of units, and all the drawings had to be converted 
(Neil 1979). 
Discussion 
Others besides the mayor blindly defended Taillibert’s work as art. 
Clement Vigneault, a structural engineer who collaborated with 
Taillibert, compared it to a Picasso painting. Tedesko retorted, 
saying that the Picasso painting should not be too large to ﬁt in the 
building, criticizing the lack of functionality of Taillibert’s designs. 
Others disagreed as to whether the engineers should just facilitate the 
architect’s art, or use and social implications had to be considered as 
well. Overall, there was a consensus that Taillibert had developed his 
designs, and then the structural engineers were brought in late to try 
to make them work (“Experts” 1976). 
Taillibert had received $6.8 million but sued RIO for $32.6 
million in unpaid fees. RIO, in turn, countersued Taillibert for $18.6 
million, contending that his errors and omissions had caused in­
excusable delays (“Court” 1983). 
The Province of Quebec assembled a Commission of Inquiry on 
the Cost of the 21st Olympiad (Province of Quebec 1980). The 
charge of the committee was to study, in particular, the following: 
1.	 The main causes of the increase in the cost of the Games and of 
the Olympic installations; 
2.	 The division of responsibility for this increase; 
3.	 The methods of organizing and supervising the work; 
4.	 The possibility of collusion, inﬂuence peddling, and fraudu­
lent or irregular activities; 
5.	 The possibility of recovering some of the public funds used 
and the appropriate measures to be taken to this end; and 
6.	 Effective prevention and control mechanisms to avoid the 
recurrence of such a situation in future major projects. 
By and large the commission conﬁrmed the allegations that Auf 
der Maur (1976) had made 4 years before, observing that Drapeau 
“appointed himself foreman and project manager” and “the choice of 
the Olympic Village design without a call for tenders or competition, 
solely because of Mayor Drapeau’s fascination with the installations of 
the Baie des Anges Marina in France” (Province of Quebec 1980). The 
Commission blamed Mayor Drapeau, Taillibert, and COJO, noting 
also that the labor unions and the contractors and suppliers had rushed 
to take full advantage of the situation. Speciﬁc instances of corrup­
tion proved hard to document because few witnesses were willing to 
testify. To retire the debt, the City of Montreal borrowed $214 million 
through a special Olympic tax on real property. Also, the Olympic 
lottery was extended until December 31, 1979, and a special tobacco 
tax had been imposed on May 12, 1976 (Province of Quebec 1980). 
Opposing View 
Paul Charles Howell wrote The Montreal Olympics: An Insider’s 
View of Organizing a Self-Financing Games (Howell 2009) to  
address what he called errors of fact and interpretation that have 
routinely been reported in the media. He had been the head of 
planning for COJO. 
Howell blames cost overruns on the oil crisis of 1973 and in­
ﬂation, and says “Despite this, the Montreal Organizers raised the 
funds, paid for the staging of the Games, built and paid for the 
Olympic Village, provided and paid for many of the competition and 
training venues, and still handed over the considerable proﬁt of  
nearly a quarter of a billion dollars to pay for its use of government-
owned facilities and cover city-incurred costs of construction” 
(Howell 2009). 
Howell also criticizes an often-used deﬁcit ﬁgure of $2.192 bil­
lion, saying that it “seems to include the cost of adding the tower and 
roof to the stadium after the games, converting the Velodrome to 
a nature museum, and the cost of the Olympic Village without the 
proceeds of the sale of the Olympic Village, plus all the late interest 
payments made” (Howell 2009) 
Howell also makes the interesting comment that Drapeau com­
mitted to using the critical-path method (CPM) and the similar 
project evaluation and review technique (PERT), developed by the 
U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), for 
the Games but not for the construction of the stadium, where it might 
have been very useful. Unfortunately, when the computer CPM/ 
PERT analysis was completed in November 1973, it projected that 
the work could not be completed before January 1977—6 months 
too late (Howell 2009). 
Conclusion 
On December 19, 2006, CBC News reported that the Olympic 
complex’s debt had ﬁnally been paid off as of a month before. CBC 
News noted, “After clinching the 1976 Olympics, the mayor of 
Montreal at the time, Jean Drapeau, boasted the Games would be the 
ﬁrst auto-ﬁnanced Olympics” (“Quebec’s” 2006). 
There are a number of technical, procedural, and ethical issues 
that contributed to the problems experienced by the Montreal 
Olympics project. There was an unrealistic deadline for the project. 
The City of Montreal was so late with design documents that most 
work packages could not be bid. Instead, most of the contracts were 
negotiated. 
Project scheduling was forced to ﬁt extremely tight deadlines. A 
proper construction schedule is based on normal crews and con­
struction activity durations so that individual activities on a critical 
path can be intelligently expedited or crashed, to prudently com­
pensate for project delays while minimizing increased costs. The 
unrealistic nature of the schedules made it impossible to intelligently 
crash selected activities. 
Despite the lack of time available, unusual construction tech­
nologies were adopted. It was extremely difﬁcult and labor-intensive 
to construct the stadium with the precast posttensioned epoxy-
connected ribs of varying sizes. The use of one-of-a-kind, single-
use formwork for the curved surfaces of the viaduct also resulted 
in increased costs. 
The time constraints and schedule compression resulted in even 
more simultaneous activities and an extremely crowded work space. 
At one point there were 80 different cranes trying to operate in the 
stadium. This resulted in cranes waiting for other cranes to ﬁnish 
their lifts, and crews standing around waiting for their turn. Dou­
bling of the amount of cranes used on the job substantially increased 
the equipment cost but only increased the productivity by 25%. 
Given the size of the project, there was a shortage of local 
resources. Labor, material, and equipment had to be brought in from 
other areas. This resulted in additional transportation costs. It also 
resulted in poorer-quality labor, as well as nonlocal labor not having 
the same sense of civic pride as regular Montreal residents. 
The original client was the City of Montreal, which did not have 
the expertise and experience to manage a job of that magnitude. A 
change in client occurred when the Province of Quebec was forced 
to step in and assume the role. Although the change was necessary, 
additional difﬁculties, such as communication problems, typically 
occur when the major constituents change during a project. In ad­
dition, the relationship of the design professionals hindered prompt 
communication. The client, architect, design engineers, and project 
management did not function as a team. 
The weather contributed to the problems, particularly because 
weather protection and heating were needed, especially for the 
concrete work and installation of the posttensioning tendons. The 
project delays pushed much of that work into the winter months. 
As noted previously, this paper has been assembled from a va­
riety of sources rather than ﬁrsthand observations. The different 
authors of the available published materials hold widely varying 
views as to the responsibility for the shortcomings. However, by and 
large they are in agreement on the basic facts. Care has been taken to 
balance the opposing viewpoints as much as possible. 
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